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Among the questions which this paper addresses are, how does a 
culture of corruption perpetuate itself over time, what effects do dif­
ferent features of the economy have on the phenomenon of corruption, and 
why the culture of corruption might or might not alter over time? 
A central feature of the present dynamic analysis is that rational 
individuals (citizens as wel 1 as burea.ucrats) learn from their past ex­
periences. The past economic environment thus affects the current choices 
of individuals which, in turn, influence the future economic enviroD111ent. 
As a result, if bureaucratic corruption has been more pervasive in the 
past, then different citizens are more likely to choose those behaviors 
(such as more extensive cheating) which induce a greater pervasiveness of 
corruption in the future. These inter-temporal behavioral externalities 
are formalized within an overlapping generations framework, and the re­
sulting aggregate corruption and cheating is characterized and analyzed. 
This positive analysis yields new perspectives as well as new re­
sults. I examine ho,, the pervasiveness of corruption and cheating is 
altered by such features of the economy as the extent of government in­
tervention, and the beliefs of the youngest generations. Among the 
results is that if youngest generations of citizens believe that corrup­
tion is more pervasive, then corruption actually becomes more pervasive. 
PERSISTENCE AND PERVASIVENESS OF CORRUPTION: 
NEW PERSPECTIVES 
Raaj Kumar Sah, Yale University 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of bureaucratic corruption is sufficiently pervasive 
in developing economies that it has not escaped the attention of any ex­
cept the most casual observers of these economies. No matter what the 
nature of a transaction between the government and a member of the public 
might be (for example, whether the transaction involves paying taxes, re­
ceiving social benefits, or protecting one's property rights of one kind 
or another), it is the case more often than not that the transaction en­
tails some degree of corruption and illegality. In fact, the problem 
might go deeper than that. To the extent that changes are occurring in 
many of these societies (for instance, new production and organization 
activities undertaken by private individuals and the government), the 
nature of change itself seems to be guided by the logic and culture of 
corruption. 
Some development economists have also recognized the central role 
that corruption (and associated features such as bureaucratic ineptness, 
apathy and abusiveness) can play in determining the generation and dis­
tribution of real incomes in LDCs. 1 In fact, it has often been argued 
that the oft-observed failures of development projects and policies dur­
ing the last three decades have been caused in large part by the fact 
l 
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that most of these projects and policies were formulated and evaluated 
within paradigms which abstracted from the phenomenon of corruption. 
The kinds of questions which the present paper addresses are, how 
does a culture of corruption perpetuate itself over time, what effects do 
different features of the economy have on the phenomenon of corruption, 
and why might the culture of corruption alter or not alter over time? 
These questions are fundamental to an understandina of the economic en­
vironment in many LDCs, and our analysis of the questions yields a number 
of qualitative results as well as new perspectives. 
A central element of our analysis consists of the following kinds of 
"dynamic behavioral externalities" which rational individuals exert on 
one another. An individual's choice of current behavior is in part based 
on his past experiences. This is because the current choice of an indi­
vidual must necessarily be based on what his beliefs are concerning the 
nature of economic environment, and these beliefs are influenced by his 
past experiences. In turn, the current behavioral choices of different 
individuals influence the current experiences and, hence, the future 
behavior of other individuals in the economy. For instance, if the past 
experiences of the members of the public (who, for brevity, are referred 
as "citizens") have convinced them that bureaucratic corruption is per­
vasive in the economy, then these individuals are more likely to under­
take those activities which are more beneficial to them in the presence 
of pervasive corruption (I use the short-hand expression "cheatinJ" to 
refer to such activities). Such choices made by the citizens, in turn, 
make it more likely that the bureaucrats would find it desirable to adopt 
those kinds of behaviors which sustain a high level of corruption in the 
3 
future. In this sense. a greater prevalence of corruption in the past 
induces a greater prevalence of corruption in the future. 2 
A natural framework within which to analyze the above dynamics is 
the overlapping generations model. because it provides an explicit basis 
to link the behaviors of different generations of individuals. Thus. in 
our analysis. each cohort lives for a finite length of time, and the be­
havior of the members of each generation influences (and is influenced 
by) the behavior of the members of other--older as well as younger-­
generations which are living contemporaneously. Another key advantage of 
this framework is that it allows significant differences in the beliefs 
(and hence in the behavioral choices) of similar individuals. For in­
stance. two citizens may believe quite differently (one may believe that 
there is extensive corruption, while the other believes that corruption 
is negligible) if their past experiences are different, even though they 
belong to the same generation. face the same economic trade-offs. and 
have started their lives with the same initial beliefs. This implication 
of the model is consistent with the diversity in individuals' beliefs 
which has often been observed.3 
The analysis developed in this paper is positive. It takes as given 
the legal and administrative structure which influences individuals' in­
centives. The relevant aspects of the legal and administrative structure 
are represented in our model through exogenous parameters, and the ef­
fects of changes in these parameters (or, alternatively, the consequences 
onof differences in these parameters between two econcaies) are traced 
the behaviors of different individuals as well as on the aggregate eco­
nomic environment. The paper does not deal with the normative question 
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of how a society should set its legal and administrative structure. 
A related aspect which is noteworthy is that our analysis is robust 
to aany of the details of the legal and administrative structure. For 
instance, what is relevant for our model of a bureaucrat's choice is a 
simple property that it .is ■ore attractive for an individual bureaucrat 
to be corrupt (or to be corrupt to a greater e%tent) if there is a great­
er prevalence of cheating aaong the citizens who have to deal with hia. 
This intuitive property would be satisfied in a variety of conte%ts (for 
instance, whether the corruption is in the conte%t of public procurement 
or in the conte%t of ta% collection), under a variety of bureaucratic 
structures (for instance, how a bureaucrat is policed and whether those 
responsible for policing are themselves potential participants in corrup­
tion), for a variety of mechanisms through which a bureaucrat might de­
tect cheating among citizens (which includes the trade-off between the 
effort spent by the bureaucrat and the probability of his being able to 
detect a cheating citizen), and under a variety of'.rnard and punishment 
schedules4 (for instance, the amounts and types of bribes involved, and 
the punishment associated with the conviction of a corrupt bureaucrat5). 
Since the present paper treads on ground which is relatively une%­
plored, I have used several 1i ■plifyin1 ass1111ptions to bring out what 
appear to ae to be 1oae of the novel aspects of the analysis. The basic 
model is developed in Section II, and it is analyzed in Section III. In 
Section 'IV, I show how the 1i■ plifying a111111ption of the basic ■odel can 
be modified. Concluding r•arks hiahlighting 1oae of the central 
features of the analysis are presented at the end. 
s 
II. TIIE BASIC MODEL 
In each period a new cohort of bureaucrats and citizens enters the 
economy. The life span of an individual is T periods, where T 12. 
Individuals begin their lives with diverse beliefs concerning the rele­
vant features of the economic environment (the relevant features for a 
bureaucrat and a citizen respectively are the extent to which cheating 
and corruption are prevalent in the economy),6 and revise their beliefs 
based on their experiences as they progress through life. I begin the 
analysis with the following simple specification. 
In each period a citizen encounters one bureaucrat, and a bureaucrat 
encounters a certain number of citizens (this number is denoted at pres­
ent by the parameter M). Individuals face binary choices in each period: 
a bureaucrat's choices are to be corrupt or not corrupt, and a citizen's 
choices are to cheat or not cheat. The actual participants of different 
encounters are determined randomly; that is, there is an equal probabil­
ity that a citizen might encounter any one of the large number of bureau­
crats in the economy, and there is an equal probability that one of the 
even larger number of citizens in the economy may belong to the subset of 
individuals whom a bureaucrat encounters within a particular period. An 
individual must make his behavioral choice before the actual encounter; 
the choice is therefore determined in part by the individual's beliefs 
and past experiences. 
The description and analysis of the choices of a citizen and a bur­
eaucrat is presented in the next three subsections. This is followed by 
a characterization of a societal equilibrium in corruption and cheating. 
6 
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A. A Citizen's Choices 
For a citizen who chooses to cheat in a particular period, the (ex­
pected) utility is u00 if he encounters a corrupt bureaucrat, and the 
utility is u01 if he encounters a bureaucrat who is not corrupt. The 
corresponding util_ities for a citizen who chooses not to cheat are u 
00 > u 11and u11 • I assume that u 10• and u > u01 • That is. cheating is 
more profitable for a citizen if he were to encounter a corrupt bureau­
crat, and not cheating is more profitable othenise.7 By making this 
assmaption, I also abstract from thos·e cases where a citizen's choice is 
trivial in the sense that it is entirely unaffected by what his beliefs 
are. 
The choice of a citizen in each period depends therefore on what his 
mean estimate of the "level of corruption" (that is, the proportion of 
corrupt bureaucrats out of the total population of bureaucrats) is, be­
cause this estimate represents the probability which this citizen asso­
ciates with the event of encountering a corrupt bureaucrat. Let 
ect, s(t), a) denote this estimate for a citizen who has lived for t 
periods, who has encountered s(t) corrupt bureaucrats during the past t 
periods (obviously. t l s(t) 10), and whose characteristics are denoted 
by the vector a. It follows then that this citizen will choose to cheat 
in the (t + l)st period of his life if and only if8 
(1) "C(t. s(t). a) l u. 
u can be viewed as the "relative cost of cheating" because it is increas­
11 10•ing in u and u and it is decreasing in u01 and u00• Also. our 
7 
assumptions concerning the pay-offs imply that 1 > u > O. 
The estimate 
~ 
C is in general increasing in s(t). This is because if 
a citizen has encountered a larger number of corrupt bureaucrats in the 
past, then his current estimate of the level of corruption must be larg­
er. The criterion (1) thus can be reexpressed as: 
(2) s<t> l r(t, u, a>, 
where r is defined implicitly by the equation C(t, r, a)= u. The eco­
nomic meaning of (2) is transparent. A citizen chooses to cheat in a 
particular period of his life if the number of his past encounters with 
corrupt bureaucrats exceeds his "reservation level." r, for that period. 
The above description of a citizen's choices does not depend in any 
way on what his initial beliefs are, To make the analysis more tract­
able, however, I shall assume that the initial beliefs of a citizen can 
be represented by a beta distribution with parameters 
a= > 0, > 0). This assU111ption is not specially restrictive be­(a1 a2 
cause other types of initial beliefs can be approximated to a reasonable 
degree by a beta distribution with appropriately chosen parameters. The 
assumption of beta initial beliefs yields the following simple expression 
for C. 9 
A al+ S(t) 
(3) C ( t. s ( t ) • al. a2 ) = 
al + a2 + t 
The initial estimate of the level of corruption (that is, the estimate 
with which a citizen begins his life) is obtained by substituting 
s(t) = t = 0 into (3). This yields 
8 
( 4) 
The effect of parameters Ca1, a2 ), which play an important role in later 
analysis, can be seen froa (4). A citizen with a larger a1 or a smaller 
-i believes in the ·beginning of ~is life that the level of corruption in 
the economy is higher. 
The main advantage of the above ass11111ption concerning the functional 
form of initial beliefs is that it yields a closed-form solution for the 
reservation level r. In fact, using (3) in combination with (1) and (2), 
one obtains 
To complete the model of a citizen's behavior, I make a minor modi­
fication which turns out to be useful later on. Note that the reserva-
tion level, r, is in general not an integer, whereas the number of cor­
rupt bureaucrats a citizen has encountered in the past, s(t), is an 
integer. To make the two compatible, I define an integer version of r; 
that is, 
(Sb) r = [rl+ 
where the symbol [ l+ denotes the standard "rounding off" function; that 
is, the function is s..e as its arauaent if the ar11111ent is an 
integer, otherwise the function equals the nezt inteaer hi&her than the 
argument. For brevity, r is referred to as the "reservation score." 
To SUIIJllarize, then, the criterion which a citizen employs for his 
9 
choice in the (t + l)st period of his life is: 
(6) Cheat if and only if s(t) L r(t, u, a1 , a ),2 
where r is given by (Sa) and (Sb). 
B. A Bureaucrat's Choices 
For simplicity I assmne at present that if a bureaucrat is corrupt 
during a particular period then his utility is linearly increasing in b 
which denotes the number of citizens who have chosen to cheat among those 
whom the bureaucrat encounters during that period. The utility of a cor­
rupt bureaucrat is thus denoted by uO(b} = tf>l + bUoo, where uOO is posi­
tive. Obviously, ML b LO. The utility of a bureaucrat who is not 
corrupt is denoted by u1 • I assume that u0(M} > ul > uO(O}. That is, 
i 
the utility of a bureaucrat who is not corrupt lies between the maximum 
possible utility of a corrupt bureaucrat (which occurs when all citizens 
whom he encounters have chosen to cheat) and the minimum possible utility 
of a corrupt bureaucrat (which occurs when none of the citizens whom he 
encounters have chosen to cheat}.lO 
Since the description of a bureaucrat's choice is analogous to that 
of a citizen's choice discussed earlier, I leave out the details and only 
note those expressions which are relevant for later analysis. Let 
ict, S(t), Jl, A) denote the "level of cheating" in the economy (that is, 
the proportion of citizens who are cheatina) as estimated by a bureaucrat 
who has lived fort periods, who has found S(t) citizens to be cheating 
among those whom he has encountered during the past t periods, and whose 
characteristics are denoted by the vector A. Then, this bureaucrat would 
choose to be corrupt in the (t + l)st period of his life if and only if 
10 
(7) ~(t, S(t), M, A) l U, 
where the parameter U = (U1 - tf>1)!MtJOO represents the "relative cost of 
corruption" because it is increasing in u1 and it is decreasing in u01 
and u00 • Also, it is apparent that 1 > U > 0. 
If i(t, U, M, A) represents the bureaucrat's reservation level, then 
(7) is equivalently represented as 
(8) S(t) l i(t, U, M, A). 
When a bureaucrat's initial beliefs are represented by a beta distribu­
tion with parameters A= (A1 > 0, ,½ > 0), then we obtain the following 
expressions which have familiar interpretations 
A + S(t)
1( 9) 'c(t, S(t), M, ~• ~) = + ~ + tM 'A1 
(lla) 
The role of parameters <Ai,,½) can be seen from (10). A bureaucrat with 
a larger Ai or a smaller,½ believes in the beginning of his life that 
the level of cheatin1 is higher in the economy. Finally, if 
Cllb) 
represents the reservation score, then the behavioral choice of a bureau­
crat, in the (t + l)st period of his life, is d,iemined by the criter-
ion: 
11 




where R is given by (lla) and (llb). 
C. Properties of Individuals' Behavior 
The patterns of an individual's behavior predicted by the preceding 
mopels are appealing. Consider for instance a citizen who had chosen to 
cheat in the last period. Then the decision rule (6) predicts that this 
citizen will also choose to cheat in the current period if he has en­
countered a corrupt bureaucrat in the last period. 11 Likewise, if a 
citizen had chosen not to cheat in the last period and had encoUJ1tered a 
bureaucrat who is not corrupt, then he will choose not to cheat in the 
current period as well. The reason is simple. Since an individual 
chooses the most profitable behavior in every period, given his current 
beliefs, he has no reason to alter his behavior in the next period if his 
recent experiences have not contradicted his previously held beliefs. 
Changes in the behavior of a bureaucrat between any two successive 
periods can be analyzed similarly. For instance, if a bureaucrat was 
corrupt in the last period, and if most of the citizens whom he encount­
ered in the last period had chosen to cheat, then this bureaucrat will be 
corrupt in the current period as well. These results are s1D11JDarized as 
follows. 
PROPOSITION 1. A bureaucrat or a citizen does not alter his behavior be­
tween two successive periods unless he has been "disappointed" by his ac­
tual experience; that is. unless his recent experience was different fr0111 
what would have been most profitable to him. given his choice of behavior 
in the last period. 
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We nezt note some intuitive properties of an individual's reserva­
tion score which are useful in later analysis. The dependence of an 
individual's reservation score on his age and on the relative cost of 
alternative behaviors follows directly from (Sa), (Sb), (lla) and (llb): 
(13) Br/at l O , Br/au l O , and 
U4> aR/at l o , aBJav l o • 
That is, an older individual can not have a smaller reservation score; 
and if the relative cost of cheating (corruption) is higher, then the 
reservation score of any citizen (bureaucrat) can not be aaller. 
Finally, consider the effect of an individual's initial beliefs on 
his reservation scores. One would ezpect the initial beliefs to play a 
more significant role in influencing an individual's choice in the earl­
ier phase of his life because he has that much less experience during 
this phase. But at the same time, given our ass'Dlllption that the individ­
ual's life span is finite, the initial beliefs of an individual continue 
to exert a systematic effect on his reservation scores throughout his 
life. To see one such effect, consider a bureaucrat who was initially 
corrupt (that is, he was corrupt in the first period of his life) and 
compare him to another bureaucrat who was initially not corrupt. Then it 
is straiahtfonard to ascertain that: 12 
PROPOSITION 2. An initially corrupt bureaucrat can not have a aaller 
reservation score durin1 any period of his life than the corresponding 
reservation score of a bureaucrat who was not initially corrupt. 
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D. Equilibrium in Aggregate Behavior 
Based on the preceding models of behavior for a bureaucrat and a 
citizen, or based on other similar models, it is straightforward to 
understand the evolution of the economy. The subset of citizens who 
choose to cheat in the current period are those for whom the condition 
(6) is satisfied. In turn, how large this subset is depends stochastic­
ally on how prevalent bureaucratic corruption has been in the past. 
Likewise, the subset of bureaucrats who choose to be corrupt in the cur­
rent period are those for whom the condition (12) is satisfied, and the 
size of this subset is determined by the extent to which citizens have 
chosen to cheat in the past. These two groups thus exert explicit be­
havioral externalities on one another. Therefore, given a set of initial 
conditions and a set of parameters representing the economy, it is pos­
sible to characterize the stochastic time-pattern of individuals' aggre­
gate behavior in the economy. 
I focus in this paper on analyzing steady-state equilibria in which 
the level of corruption or the level of cheating does not alter from 
period to period. 13 Let C and c denote respectively the steady-state 
levels of corruption and cheating. The set of equations which determine 
the steady-states are derived below. 
Steady-state level of cheating: Let ct+l denote the level of cheat-
ing in the (t + l)st generation; that is, in the generation which has 
T-1 
already lived fort periods. Then c = ( l:ct+l)/T. The level of 
tcO 
cheating in the youngest generation is obtained directly frCIII the par~ 
eters of the economy because the citizens in this generation have had no 
exposure to the economic enviromDent. In fact, fort= 0 and s(t) = 0, 
14 
expressions (2) and (5a) yield 
where 11 (a1 ) and 12.<a2) are the distribution functions of a1 and re­a2 
spectively. It is also being assumed here that the distribution of ini­
tial beliefs (across ■ embers of a cohort) is the same for all cohorts. 
Next consider any one of the older 1enerations of citizens. The 
probability that a citizen chooses to ·cheat in the (t + l)st period of 
his life is the same as the probability of (6) being satisfied. Now 
whether a citizen encounters a corrupt bureaucrat during any single 
period is a Bernoulli trial with success probability C. Thus the prob­
ability of (6) being satisfied is same as the probability of s(t) or more 
successes out oft Bernoulli trials where the probability of success in 
each trial is C. Accordingly. the probability of (6) being satisfied is 
given by the Binomial distribution function14 
(16) 
By aggregating (16) over all ■embers of the (t + l)st generation, we ob­
tain the level of cheating in this aeneration: 
Further, by aaaregating (15) and (17) across aenerations, we obtain the 
economy-wide level of cheating. That is 
15 
1T-l t+l 
(18) C!!TI,c =f(C) 
t=O 
where f(C) is a short-hand expression for the function at the right hand 
side of (18). 
Steady-state Level of Corruption: The derivation of the steady-
state level of corruption is quite similar to that above. The details 
are therefore omitted and only the relevant expressions are presented. 
The level of corruption in the youngest generation of bureaucrats is 
probability that a bureaucrat, whose initial beliefs are represented by 
<A1, A2), would choose to be corrupt during the (t + l)st period of his 
life is 
(20) B(R(t, U, M, ~• A:2), tM, c) = 
Therefore, the level of corruption in the (t + l)st aeneration is 
Finally, the economy-wide level of corruption is obtained by aggregating 





where F(c) represents the function on the right hand side of (22). The 
above equation, in combination with (18), determines the steady-state 
levels of cheating and corruption. 
III. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF AGGllDATE 
COIUWPTION AND CHEATING 
The model developed above yields a number of insights; these are 
slUIIJllarized in this section. I begin with some important issues concern­
ing the multiplicity and stability of equilibria. It is then argued that 
under plausible assumptions we should ezpect a diversity in individuals' 
behavior rather than uniformity. The final subsection is devoted to as­
certaining the effects of changes in the parameters of the economy on 
societal corruption and cheating. 
A. !!!!tiplicity and Stability of F.quilibria 
Note from (18) and (22) that c is a polynomial in C, and C is a 
polynomial inc. Also, the highest possible order of each of these poly­
nomials is T - 1. Thus, unless there are special circumstances (for in­
stance, the life span of individuals is too short; aay. Tc 2). it would 
be the case that there are multiple equilibria. Therefore. two economies 
with identical set of parameters can have 1i1nificantly different levels 
of corruption and cheating. The reason for the multiplicity of equilib-
17 
ria is that the current behavior of individuals is explicitly influenced 
by their past behaviors. Therefore. the particular steady-state to which 
an economy settles (when it does) is influenced by the history of the 
economy preceding the steady-state. 15 
In the analysis· below. we restrict our attention to only those equi­
libria which are locally stable; this is because the economy does not 
return to a locally unstable equilibri'DII after a small perturbation. A 
necessary condition for the local stability of an equilibrium defined by 
(18) and (22) is 
(23 ) fr!C ( 1 • 
where a subscript off or F denotes the variable with respect to which a 
partial derivative is being taken. The stability condition (23) plays a 
central role in the comparative dynamics analysis presented below. There­
fore. a derivation of this stability condition is provided in Appendix I. 
Also. it is obvious that our interest is limited to only those solu­
tions of (18) and (22) for which both c and Care not smaller than zero 
or larger than one. This is because other values of c and C do not have 
an economic meaning in the present context. 
B. Diversity versus Uniformity in Individuals' Behavior 
Is a complete unifonnity in individuals' behavior (for instance. an 
economy in which all bureaucrats are corrupt. or no bureaucrat is cor­
rupt) a likely possibility? The analysis below shows that the answer is 
no. That is, under plausible assumptions we should expect a diversity in 
individuals' behavior. 
Consider the possibility of an equilibrium in which no bureaucrat is 
18 
corrupt (that is, the "corner" equilibrium where C = 0). Such an equi­
librilllll obviously requites the youngest generations of bureaucrats to be 
free of corruption. Furthermore, this corner equilibrium is infeasible 
if even a few members of the youngest generations of citizens are choos­
ing to cheat. This is because the arrival of these few citizens into the 
economy in each period induces, aiven sufficiently long life span, at 
least some bureaucrats (those who happen to encounter these citizens) to 
believe that it is in their interest to be corrupt. The corresponding 
choice of these bureaucrats to be corrupt, in turn, leads to more citi­
zens deciding to cheat in the future. The resulting equilibrilllll must 
therefore entail at least some cheating as well as some corruption. 
A noteworthy aspect of the above argument is that it is effective 
only if the life span of bureaucrats is not too brief. If the life span 
is too brief then it is possible that the behavioral externalities gener­
ated by a small subset of individuals may die out before they have had an 
opportunity to affect the economy's equilibrium. 
Parallel reasoning suggests the infeasibility of other corner equi­
libria; that is, of the equilibrium where all bureaucrats are corrupt, 
and of the equilibria where all or none of the citizens choose to cheat. 
These conclusions are 11mJDarized below. 16 
PROPOSITION 3 • If the life •Ean of individuals is not too brief then 
(a) C > 0 even if cl ... o. J!rOVided cl > o. 
(b) C < 1 even if cl .. 1, J!rovided cl < 1. 
(c) C ) 0 even if cl= 0, J!rOVided cl > o. 
(d) C < 1 even if cl = 1, Erovided cl > o. 
19 
Next, consider the polar case where there is complete absence of 
corruption and cheating in the youngest generations (that is, cl= O and 
c1 = 0). Then it is straightforward to verify that an equilibrium in 
which there is no corruption or cheating in the economy is feasible; that 
is, C = 0 and c = O.is a feasible solution of (18) and (22). Yet there 
is no economic reason to expect this particular corner equilibri11111 to be 
necessarily stable. On the contrary. examples can be constructed in 
which such an equilibri11111 is not stable (that is, it does not satisfy the 
condition (23)), particularly if the life span of individuals is not too 
brief. To see the reason, consider a slight perturbation of this corner 
equilibrium which introduces a small number of corrupt bureaucrats in the 
economy. Then, given sufficient life span, these handful of bureaucrats 
can initiate a chain reaction of behavioral externalities (inducing citi­
zens to cheat and, in turn, inducing other bureaucrats to be corrupt) so 
that the economy can not return to the same equilibrium. Thus 
PROPOSITION 4. Some bureaucrats might be corrupt and some citizen might 
choose to cheat even if the youngest generations of bureaucrats is free 
gf_J:orruption and the youngest generations of citizens is free of 
cheating. 
Analogously, though the corner equilibrium in which all bureaucrats 
are corrupt and all citizens cheat (that is, C = 1 and c = 1) is feasible 
for certain sets of parameters (for which, cl= 1 and cl= 1), this corn­
er equilibrium also may not be stable. 
20 
C. Effects of Economy's Parameters on Aggregate Corruption and 
Cheating 
The method for comparative dynamics analysis is as follows. Let e 
denote a parameter which affects the function fin (18), and let e denote 
a parameter which affects the function Fin (22). That is, the equation 
system 
(24) c = f(C, 8), and C = F(c, f) 
defines the equilibrium values of c and C. Then perturbing the above 
equation system in the neighborhood of a locally stable equilibrium, and 
using (23), it is easily ascertained that17 
(25) sgn(dc/d8) = sgn(dC/d9) = sgn(f ), and9 
(26) san(dc/dO) = sgn(dC/dO) = sgn(F ).
9 
I now employ the above expressions to deteniine the effects of different 
parameters on a societal equilibrium. 
Effect of Changes in the Cost of Cheating and the Cost of Corrup­
tion: In many cases, a reduction in government intervention reduces the 
opportunities of corruption available to bureaucrats, which in turn would 
increase the relative cost of corruption for an individual bureaucrat. 18 
The consequences of such a change in the relative cost on the societal 
equilibrium are easily ascertained. If this change in incentives prevents 
even a few of the bureaucrats from beina corrupt, as one would expect to 
be the case, then the incidence of cheating would decline in the future 
because the citizens would encounter fner corrupt bureaucrats. In turn, 
this would reduce the future incidence of corruption. As a result of 
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this chain reaction, the economy would settle to an equilibrium in which 
the level of corruption as well as the level of cheating is lower. 
To confirm the above intuition, recall from (14) that the reserva­
tion score of any bureaucrat can not decrease if the relative cost of 
corruption, U, is larger. Also, from (20), B must decrease if R in­
creases. Now to avoid unnecessary details, I assume that if U is larger, 
then the reservation score for at least one bureaucrat increases during 
at least one period of his life. Correspondingly, in the right hand side 
of (22), Bis smaller for at least one set of (t, Ai, ,½). Thus Fu< O 
and, from (26), dc/dU < 0 and dC/dU < O. A similar analysis of the ef­
fect of a change in the relative cost of cheating, u, shows that 
de/du< 0 and dC/du < O. · We therefore obtain 
PROPOSITION 5. A larger relative cost of corruption or a larger relative 
cost of cheating lowers the level of corruption as well as the level of 
cheating. 
Effect of Changes in Initial Beliefs: The initial beliefs of a bur­
eaucrat are represented in the present model by (A1 , ,½). As (10) indi­
cates, a bureaucrat with a larger Ai or a smaller-½_ begins his life with 
a larger estimate of the level of cheating in the economy. A first-order 
stochastic improvement in the distribution of Ai, or a first-order stoc­
hastic worsening in the distribution of¼, therefore represents that the 
youngest generations of bureaucrats believe that there is a greater prev­
alence of cheating in the economy. Likewise, a first-order stochastic 
improvement in the distribution of a1 , or a first-order stochastic wors­
ening in the distribution of a2 , represents that the youngest generations 
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of citizens believe that there is a greater prevalence of corruption in 
the economy. 
Each of the preceding four stochastic changes have similar implica­
tions. Consider a first-order stochastic improvement in the distribution 
of Ai• From (lla), .this means that the distribution of reservation levels 
across bureaucrats shifts to the left. Consequently, at least a few more 
bureaucrats would be corrupt than what would have been the case in the 
absence of the stochastic change. This, in turn, sets up a chain reac­
tion encouraging more citizens to cheat and more bureaucrats to be cor­
rupt. The new equilibrimn to which the economy would settle would thus 
entail higher levels of corruption and cheating. The effects of other 
stochastic changes are traced similarly. These results are summarized 
bel01r, and a formal derivation is presented in Appendix 2. 
PROPOSITION 6. If the youngest generations of bureaucrats believe that 
the level of cheating is higher in the economy, or if the youngest gener­
ations of citizens believe that the level of corruption is higher in the 
economy, then the actual level of corruption as well as the actual level 
of cheating in the economy is higher. 
Effect of Age on Different Generations' Behavior: A difference be­
tween an older and a younger aeneration is that the fonier has had more 
opportunities to observe the economic enviro1111ent. Our objective then is 
to ascertain whether the levels of corruption and cheating are hiaher or 
lower in older generations. 
To explore an intuitive anner, consider a bureaucrat's behavior in 
two successive periods. If most of the citizens he has encountered in 
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the last period had chosen to cheat (an event which is more likely to 
occur if the level of cheating in the economy is higher). then this bur­
eaucra twill revise upwards his estimate of the level of cheating in the 
economy. Correspondingly. the possibility of his being corrupt (rather 
than not corrupt) during the current period would increase. The preced­
ing observation then suggests that the level of corruption in an older 
generation of bureaucrats is likely to be higher, rather than lower, if 
the level of cheating is higher. This intuition is not entirely complete 
however because bureaucrats' choices are also affected by the relative 
cost of corruption (that is. a larger cost makes it less attractive to be 
corrupt) and by their initial beliefs (for instance, a person with very 
strongly held initial beliefs is less likely to alter his behavior with 
time and experience). To take into account all of these aspects. we ob­
tain the following result from an approximated version of (21): 
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t+l 
(27) sgn(aC /at)= sgn(c - U), 
if the youngest generations of bureaucrats are indifferent between being 
corrupt or not corrupt. 
The corresponding expression to ascertain the effect of age on the 
level of cheating in different generations of citizens, obtained from an 
approximated version of (17). is: 
t+l
(28) sgn(ac /at)= s1n(C - u), 
if the youngest generations of citizens are indifferent between cheating 
and not cheating. These results are s11111JDarized below. 
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PROPOSITION 7. An older generation of bureaucrats is more corrupt than 
younger generations if the level of cheating in the economy is larger 
than the relative cost of corruption, and if the youngest generations of 
bureaucrats are indifferent between being corrupt or not corrupt. Anal-
02ously. an older generation of citizens cheats to a greater extent than 
younger generations if the level of corruption in the economy is larger 
than the relative cost of cheating, and if the youngest generations of 
ci thens are indifferent between cheating or not cheating. 
Effects of Changes in the Life Span: To look into the effects of a 
change in the life span (from T to T + 1) on the societal equilibrium, we 
obtain the following tw9 results from (18), (22), (25), and (26). 20 
(29) A longer life span of bureaucrats increases (decreases) c as 
well as C, if the current cT is larger (smaller) than C. 
(30) A longer life span of citizens increases (decreases) c as well 
as C, if the current cT is larger (smaller) than c. 
I focus on the interpretation of (29); the interpretation of (30) is 
similar. The result (29) is intuitive because if the level of corruption 
in the oldest generation is higher than the economy-wide level of corrup­
tion, then the direct effect of a longer life span of bureaucrats is to 
increase the econcay-wide level of corruption (because the oldest genera­
tion gets to live for one more period, and it therefore increases the 
average) and the indirect effect is to induce a areater extent of cheat­
ing and corruption. The new equilibrium. therefore entails a higher level 
of corruption as well as a higher level of cheating in the economy. 
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Next, recall that Proposition 7 provides a set of sufficient condi­
tions for the monotonicity of ct+l and ct+l ,rith respect to t. We use 
this proposition to obtain the following, easily understandable, result 
for the case ,rhere the youngest generations of bureaucrats are indiffer­
ent bet,reen being corrupt or not corrupt, and the youngest aenerations of 
citizens are indifferent between cheating or not cheating. 
PROPOSITION 8. A longer life span of bureaucrats increases the level of 
corruption as ,rell as the level of cheating if the current level of 
cheating is larger than the relative cost of corruption. Similarly. a 
longer life span of citizens increases the level of corruption as ,rell as 
the level of cheating if the current level of corruption is larger than 
relative cost of cheating. 
Effect of Changes in M: We finally ascertain the effect of a change 
in the number of citizens encountered by a bureaucrat during a single 
period. There are two effects of an increase in M, say from M to 
(M + 1), on the behavior of a bureaucrat in the (t + l)st generation: 
(i) his sample size increases by t because he no,, obtains one more obser­
vation in each of the past M periods, and (ii) his reservation level in­
creases because he now needs a greater evidence of cheating (that is, a 
larger number of past encounters ,rith citizens who had chosen to cheat) 
to be convinced that it is in his interest to be corrupt. 
The overall effect of an increase in Mon the probabilities of dif­
ferent bureaucrats being corrupt or not corrupt is therefore ambiguous, 
as can be seen from (20). It is intuitive however to expect that if the 
current level of cheating is high (say, the current c is close to one) 
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then a larger Mwould increase the probabilities of different bureaucrats 
being corrupt. This is because a larger M would make it more likely that 
the increased reservation levels are satisfied. If this is the case. then 
the level of corruption and cheating in the economy would increase. On 
the other hand. if ihe level of cheating is low (say. the current c is 
close to zero) then one might expect that a larger K would reduce the 
level of corruption and cheating. The above intuition is supported. with 
some qualifications. by the following result (for a proof. see Appendix 
2). 
PROPOSITION 9. A larger M implies an increased (decreased) level of cor­
ruption as well as an increased (decreased) level of cheating in the 
economy if the current level of cheating is larger (smaller) than the 
relative cost of corruption and if the youngest generations of bureau­
crats are indifferent between being corrupt or not corrupt. 
IV. IIORE GENERAL IIODPLS 
The simple model analyzed in preceding sections can be generalized 
in a variety of ways. In each case. there would be a concomitant change 
in some of the details of the analysis but the qualitative issues which 
we have emphasized would not be significantly affected. S0111e of these 
generalizations are briefly discussed in this section. 
Heterogeneity in Individuals' Characteristics: The only relevant 
source of heterogeneity in individuals' characteristics in the preceding 
model is that due to their initial beliefs. To see how other kinds of 
heterogeneity can be introduced. consider the case where the benefits to 
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a citizen from alternative actions (that is, from cheating versus not 
cheating) depend in part on his income. Let the parameter a3 denote the 
income of a citizen, and let his relative cost of cheating be represented 
as u(a3 ). It is then straightfor,rard to characterize the societal equi­
librium for any given distribution of incomes in the economy. Further­
more, intuitive results of the following kind are easily established: ll 
a citizen's relative cost of cheating is decreasing in his income, then a 
first-order stochastic improvement in the distribution of incomes results 
in a higher level of corruption as wel1 as a higher level of cheating. 
The effects of other types of heterogeneity (such as the heterogeneity in 
individuals' tastes for cheating or corruption, and the heterogeneity in 
their risk-aversion) can be assessed similarly. 
Sources of an Individual's Learning: The exogenous parameters rep­
resenting the nature of an individual's learning can be given more gen­
eral meaning than that in the preceding model. For instance, the number 
of citizens that a bureaucrat encounters during a period or the number of 
bureaucrats a citizen encounters during a period may be stochastic rather 
than fixed parameters. Other sources of learning can also be included in 
the analysis (for instance, interaction with one's peers) but in doing so 
one needs to take into account the direct costs of such learnina as well 
as the indirect costs of potential miscommunication. At yet another 
level of generalization, the nature of an individual's learning may in 
part be influenced by his own choices; for instance, whether a citi&en 
encounters a bureaucrat in a particular period (or how many bureaucrats 
he encounters) is partly a matter of the citizen's own choice which is, 
in turn, detemined by his beliefs and by the pecuniary trade-offs he 
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faces. In each case. the basic feature of the analysis would remain siar­
ilar to that in preceding sections. 
A Bureaucrat's Trade-offs: The simple reduced-form representation 
of a bureaucrat's trade-offs which was employed in preceding sections is: 
a bureaucrat's choice is binary (to be corrupt or not corrupt) and his 
aains from being corrupt are linearly increasing in the number of citi­
zens who are cheating. To generalize this specification. consider the 
following two steps. 
First, let a bureaucrat's choice remain binary. which would be the 
case if the probability of convicting a corrupt bureaucrat and the pun­
ishment imposed upon a corrupt bureaucrat are not significantly different 
whether he is corrupt with respect to one or more than one citizen. Also. 
recalling the notations defined earlier, let V(b) = uO(b) - u1 denote the 
difference between a bureaucrat's ex-post utilities from being corrupt 
versus being not corrupt. Then, for a wide range of transactions between 
bureaucrats and citizens, we would expect V(b) to be increasing in b, but 
not always linearly as was assumed in preceding sections. Further, if 
the ex-ante (expected) value of V(b) is represented as V(S(t), t, M, A), 
then we would expect V to be increasing in S(t). That is, the ex-ante 
utility from being corrupt (rather than not corrupt) would be higher for 
a bureaucrat if he has encountered a larger number of citizens who are 
cheating. Now, since a bureaucrat's rational choice is to be corrupt if 
and only if V LO, it is easily verified that this choice can be repre­
sented by a criterion such as (12). The corresponding societal equilib­
rium is accordingly characterized. 
Next, consider an illustration of those situations where a bureau-
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crat can be partially corrupt. Let a denote the fraction of citizens to 
whom a bureaucrat offers corruption as a basis for transaction, where 
these offers are accepted by the citizens who have chosen to cheat. The 
ex-ante utility in this case can be represented in a reduced form as 
V(S(t), t, M, A, a), where the bureaucrat chooses a to maximize this ex­
ante utility. It would then be the case for a wide variety of circwn­
stances that the optimal a, denoted by a•(S(t), t, M, A), is increasing 
in S{t). That is, the extent of partial corruption currently chosen by a 
bureaucrat is higher if he has encountered in the past a larger n1111ber of 
citizens who are cheating. Once again, then, it can be shown that the 
behavioral externalities exerted by individuals on one another and the 
resulting societal equilibrium has qualitative properties similar to 
those analyzed earlier. 
Finally, for simplicity, I have assumed thus far that an individ­
ual's relative pay-offs (specifically, the relative cost of cheating to a 
citizen and the relative cost of corruption to a bureaucrat) are not 
affected by the levels of cheating and corruption in the economy. On the 
other hand, we would in general expect changes in the societal environ­
ment to influence the kinds of economic activities which individuals do 
or do not undertake. A simple example is the possibility that a higher 
level of corruption lowers the amounts of bribes which a corrupt bureau­
crat can potentially extract, and this in turn reduces the attractiveness 
of corruption to a bureaucrat. Such aodifications alter some of the de­
tails of the analysis (for instance the extreme riaht hand aide of (22) 
will now be a function of c as well as C) but not its nature. 
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V. CONQ.UDING REMARl:S 
This paper has developed an economic model to analyze the evolution 
and the perpetuation of bureaucratic corruption, and to identify ho,r such 
processes mi1ht be related to the characteristics of the economy. I con­
clude the paper with remarks highlighting some of the central features of 
the analysis presented earlier. These remarks also 11J1derscore some of 
the limitations of the analysis which have not been previously noted. 
The basic source of dynamics in our analysis is that an individual's 
past experiences of dealing with the economic environment provide him 
with inference and partial knowledge concerning the enviromnent which he 
211s. currently f . Th · · f · ·ac1ng. . e econom1c env1romnents o prev1ous per1ods 
(which are themselves aggregations of how individuals had chosen to be­
have in those respective periods), therefore, affect individuals' ration­
al choices in the current period. The resulting economic enviromnent of 
the current period, in turn, influences the economic environments of 
future periods. It is apparent that such a dynamics is relevant not only 
to the phenomenon of bureaucratic corruption but also to those other 
aspects of human behavior where past experiences influence current eco­
nomic choices. 22 
An advanta1e of an explicit historical process of the kind described 
above is that one can, in principle, study the pattern of evolution of 
the economy. For instance, 1iven a set of initial conditions, and a set 
of rand011 shocks to which the economy might be subject, it is possible to 
calculate the probabilities of different patterns of bureaucratic corrup­
tion throu1h which the economy ■ iaht evolve over time. Depend~ng on the 
underlying parameters, such a model can predict patterns consistent with 
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rapid changes in societal behavior (for instance, cases where a set of 
shocks lead the economy rapidly into hyper-corruption) as well as pat­
terns which are consistent with a relative lack of change in societal 
behavior (for instance, cases in which the effects of temporary reforms 
in the salary or the policing structure of bureaucrats die out, given the 
forces of persistence, before they have had an opportunity to affect the 
level of corruption which will be sustained in the economy). 
For brevity. I have not analyzed this kind of dynamics in the pres­
ent paper. Instead, I have focused on those steady-states of the economy 
in which. in the absence of external shocks, certain features of the 
economy (specifically, the level of cheating and the level of corruption 
in the economy) do not change from period to period. I have then anal­
yzed these steady-states (which, in general, are multiple) to derive a 
number of qualitative results; in particular. a result showing that the 
economy-wide extremes of corruption and cheating might be unlikely. and 
several results identifying the effects of the economy's parameters on 
the steady-state levels of corruption and cheating. 
Moreover, the historical process described earlier allows us. once 
again. to be explicit about how different steady-states might be reached 
23by the economy. For instance, two economies with identical underlying 
parameters may reach two different steady-states if their initial condi­
tions were different, or if they had faced different kinds of shocks in 
• the past, or if they had faced similar shocks but at different times in 
the past. In any event, once the patterns of econoaic environment in 
these two otherwise identical economies beain to diverge, there is no 
natural force in these economies to reduce and eliminate these 
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differences. 
Finally. an important aspect of our analysis is that it applies to 
economies with a variety of leaal. political and administrative struc­
tures. A primary role of these structures is to influence the nature of 
pecuniary trade-offs faced by individuals (for instance. the relative 
cost of corruption faced by a bureaucrat, and the relative coat of cheat­
ing faced by a citizen). Obviously, therefore, these structures affect 
the precise dynamic path of corruption and cheating in the economy as 
well as the precise steady-state to which the economy •iaht settle. Yet. 
no matter what the nature of leaal and bureaucratic structure might be. 
the positive analysis on which we have focused remains unaffected so long 
as an individual's choice is partly a consequence of what his beliefs are 
concerning the nature of the environment he faces. and so long as these 
beliefs are influenced by the individual's past experiences of dealicg 
with the environment. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The purpose of this Appendix is to demonstrate that (23) is a neces­
sary condition for the local stability of the equation system (18) and 
(22). To do this. I begin with a dynamic model of which a special case 
is the equation system (18) and (22). 
denote different periods. It is clear from the 
model described in the text (Section I.D) that the level of cheating in 
the current period depends on the levels of corruption in previous T - 1 
periods. This dependence can be represented in general as 
(Al) c(~) = z(C(~ - 1) •••.• C(~ - T + 1)). 
Likewise, the level of corruption can be represented in general as 
(A2) C(~) = Z(c(~ - 1), •.. , c(~ - T + 1)). 
A special case of the above equation system, reckoned at a steady-state, 
is the equation system (18) and (22). 
Let z.
J 
denote the partial derivative of z with respect to its jth 
argument in (Al). and let Zj denote the partial derivat,J.ve of Z with re-
spect to its jth argument in (A2). This Appendix establishes the follow­
ing. 
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PROPOSITION 10. A necessary condition for the local stability of the 
difference equation system (Al) and (A2) is 
T-1 T-1 
(A3) ( [z.)( '[Z.) < 1. 
j=l J j=l J 
The reason why this proposition is central to our purpose is that if 
this proposition holds then it is evident that (23) is a necessary condi­
tion for the stability of the steady-state equilibri11111 defined by (18) 
and (22). 
My strategy for proving Proposition 10 is as follows. Rather than 
to provide a direct proof, I first transform the system (Al) and (A2) 
into another system in which the current c is a function of past e's, and 
the current C is a function of past C's. I then show that (A3) is a 
necessary condition for the stability of the transformed system. This 
proof is presented in three steps. 
Step 1: Substituting (A2) into (Al), the current c can be expressed 
as a function of past values of e's. In particular 
(A4) c(~) = z(Z(c(~ - 2), •••• c(~ - T)), •••• 
Z(c(~ - T), ••• , c(~ - 2T + 2)), 
which can be reexpre11ed, in turn, in a reduced fora as 
(AS) c(~) = z(c(~ - 2), •••• c(~ - 2T + 2)). 
In the above expression, let ac(~)/acc~ - ■) be denoted as em· Then it 
is easily shown that 
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2T-2 T-1 T-1 
(A6) :re = ( ,rz.)( rz.). 
m=2 m j=l J j=l J 
This is because, from (A4) and (AS), 
2T-2 2t-2 T-1 acc-r _ i2 
(A7) re= r LZ·ac )"
m=2 m m=2 j=l J c 't - m 
Next note from (A2) that 
(AS) aC ( "t - j ) = Z . if j + T - 1 L m L j + 1, and 
ac('t - m) m-J 
= 0 otherwise. 
T-1 j+T-1 
Usin& (AS), the right hand side of (A7) becomes !: z. L Z . • A re-
j=l Jm=j+l m-J 
arrangement of the subscripts in the preceding expression allows (A7) to 
be rewritten as (A6). 
Using an analogous reasoning, the current value of C can be express­
ed as a function of the past C's. That is 
(A9) C("t) = Z(C("t - 2), ••• , C('t - 2T + 2)); 
and if ac(-r)/aC(-r - m) is denoted as Em, then it is easily established 
that 
2T-2 ·T-1 T-1 
(AlO) :! E = ( I: zj )( [ Z. ). 
m=2 m j=l j=l J 
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Step 2: I now show that a necessary condition for the local stabil-
ity of (AS) is 
2T-2 
(All) re < 1. 
m=2 m 
To show this, I use a standard technique of converting the difference 
equation (AS), which is of order 2T - 2, into a system of first-order 
difference equations. Define x1 (~) E c(~). and xJ(~) E xj-l(~ - 1) for 
j = 2 to 2T- 2. Define the column ve·ctor x(~) e [xl(~) •••• , x2T-2 (~)]. 
Then equation (AS) can be equivalently expressed as the vector equation 
(Al2) x(~) = X(x(~ - 1)), 
where the derivatives of X with respect to x(~ - 1) are represented by 
the companion matrix 
0 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0(Al3) 
0 0 0 1 0 
A necessary and sufficient condition for (AS) to be stable is that the 
magnitude of every ei1envalue of (Al3) should be uaaller than one (for a 
proof of this result, see Hirsch and Smale, 1974, pp. 280-81). 
To see that (All) is necessary for the stability of (AS), note that 
the characteristic polynomial of matrix (Al3) is 
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(A14) PO.) 
where A denotes an eigenvalue of matrix (A13). Now suppose (All) does 
not hold. Then (Al4) shows that P(l) i 1. This violates one of the 
Schur-Cohn criteria for the roots of the polynomial (A14) to have magni­
tudes smaller than one (see LaSalle. 1986, p. 27, for a description of 
these standard criteria). Therefore, (All) is necessary for the stabil-
ity of (AS). 
2T-2 
Step 3: The proof that [E',n < 1 is a necessary condition for the 
m=2 
stability of (A9) is identical to that in Step 2. From (A6) and (AlO}, 
therefore, (A3) is a necessary condition for the stability of (AS) and 
(A9). But then (AS) and (A9} are transformed versions of (Al) and (A2}. 
Therefore (A3) is a necessary condition for the stability of the system 
(Al) and (A2). This completes the proof of Proposition 10. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Proof of Proposition 6: Let the distribution function of Ai be de­
noted by G1 (A1 • f) auch that a larger value of the paraaeter fl signifies 
a first-order stochastic iaproveaent. That ia: aG1 /afl i o. where the 
strict inequality holds for at least s011e values of Ai• and where the 
end-points of the distribution of Ai are fixed. Froa (22) and fr011 a 
standard result on stochastic dominance. then F
0 
> 0 if: dB/dA1 10 and 
the strict inequality holds for at least some values oft. and for soae 
values of Ai where clJ1 /dfl < O. Next. note from (lla). (llb) and (20) 
that: dR/dA1 ~ o. and dB/dR < O. Also. to avoid unneceuary details. 
assume that dR/dA.i is strictly negative for some values oft, and for 
some values of Ai where cE1/d0 is strictly negative. Therefore Ffl > o. 
and the result concerning the effect of a change in fl on C and c follows 
from (26). Analogous proofs apply for the results concerning the sto­
chastic changes in the distributions of "2• and a2 •a1 
Derivation of E.Jpressions (27) and (28): If t ia treated as a con­
tinuous variable, then the distinction between the reservation level and 
reservation score (that ia between Rand R) can be ignored. Next, a 
normal approxiaation of the binomial distribution function (20) is: 
- -1/2(Al5) B • 1 - N[(R - tKc){tKc(l - c)) ]. 
where Ria 1iven by (lla) and N[] represents the distribution function 
for the unit normal variate. The derivative of B with respect tot. from 
(Al5), can be rearranged to yield: 
I 
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(Al6) sgn(dB/dt) = sgn[tM(c - U) + A•]. 
where A•~ (A1 + Az)U - A1 denotes the initial·reservation level. Now 
from the definition of A• and from (8) and (lla) it follows that the 
yoUJ1.gest 1enerations of bureaucrats are indifferent between being corrupt 
or. not corrupt if A• :: O. The result (27) then is obtained from (Al6) 
and (21). The derivation of (28) follows similar lines. 
Proof of Proposition 9: Treating Has a continuous variable and 
using the approximation (A15), one obtdns 
(Al 7) sgn(dB/dM) = sgn[tH(c - U) + A•], 
where A• represents (as before) the initial reservation level. There­
fore: dB/dM ( 0 if ct U, and A• z O. The proposition follows by using 
(22) and (26). 
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FOOINOTES 
1. See Lewis (1955, Chs. III and VII) for a pioneering discussion. For 
related llarxist views, see Melotti (1977). 
2. Dynamic behavioral externalities of the kind described here may play 
a fundamental economic role in detei:mining other societal phenomena 
as well. But, as one would expect, the motivation of the analysis 
as well as the formalization would be quite different depending on 
what is being studied. See my 1985 and 1987 papers respectively for 
analyses of societal honesty and of criminal behavior. It should 
also be noted here that several earlier researchers have alluded to 
the idea of sequential causation between individuals' beliefs and 
economic behavior. Pareto's (1916) discussion is one of the earli­
est; for a summary of some of the views of Pareto, see Samuels 
(1974, pp. 111-123). 
3. An example in a related but different context is the Gallup Poll on 
how citizens rate the honesty and ethical standards of local politi­
cal officeholders in the United States [see, Gallup (1976-86)]. This 
survey, which has now been repeated for several years, shows sub­
stantial variance in the cross-section of responses, and this vari­
ance remains substantial even among respondents who are homogeneous 
with respect to characteristics such as income, occupation, race and 
sex [see, Vol. 2 (1972-76), pp. 823-850]. I am not aware of a 
routinely conducted survey of how citizens in an LDC rate the extent 
of bureaucratic corruption, but I expect that significant variance 
in responses would be observed in such a survey. 
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4. For an analysis of how legal and administrative structure arid sanc­
tions influence a bureaucrat's incentive to be corrupt. see Rose­
Ackerman (1978). For a descriptive taxonomy of bribery. see Reisman 
(1979). 
5. I do not however consider the case in which infinite punishment is 
imposed on a corrupt bureaucrat (with s0111e probability of convic­
tion) because such practices are not typically observed. Whether 
the absence of such punishments is due to the costs of erroneous 
conviction or due to other reasons is not a relevant issue for the 
present positive analysis. 
6. The distribution of. initial beliefs across individuals is assumed to 
be an exogenously specified feature of the economy. I do not go 
into the origins of initial beliefs. 
7. These pay-offs can be further specialized to the case where a citi­
zen who does not cheat obtains the same utility whether he encount­
ers a corrupt or a not corrupt bureaucrat. That is. u10 = u11 • But 
this special case may not represent the oft-observed situations in 
which a corrupt bureaucrat extorts resources from even those citi­
zens who have not cheated. 
8. To derive (1). note that the utility from cheating is 
cu00 + (1 C)u01 and the utility fr0111 not cheating is 
cu10 + (1 C)u11 • The former is DO aialler than the latter if (1) 
is satisfied. For simplicity, it is ass'lllled in (1) that an individ­
ual chooses to cheat if he is indifferent between cheating and not 
cheating. The analysis remains unchanged if the opposite assumption 
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is made. 
9. The derivation of (3) is as follows. Let dh(e; a1 , a2 ) denote the 
probability density which a citizen associates in the beginning of 
life with the level of corruption e, where 1 Le L 0, and where 
h( a; a1 , a2 ) is the distribution function for be ta distribution ,r ith 
parameters and a2 • Now, whether or not this citizen encounters aa1 
corrupt bureaucrat during any single period can be viewed as the 
outcome of a Bernoulli trial. Therefore, using a standard result in 
Bayesian statistics (see, Rao, 1973, p. 335), the posterior beliefs 
of a citizen ,rho has encountered s(t) corrupt bureaucrats during the 
past t periods can be represented by the distribution function 
h(e; + s(t), + t - s(t)). The mean estimate of the level ofa1 a2 
corruption is then /edh(e; + s(t), + t - s(t)) which equalsa1 a2 
+ s(t))/(a1 + + t).(a1 a2 
10. Once again, this assumption is not only reasonable but it also 
allows us to abstract from those cases where a bureaucrat's choice 
is entirely insensitive to his beliefs. 
11. The proof is as follows. From (2) and (5a), 
s(t) ~ + + t)u - a1 for a citizen who had chosen to cheat in(a1 a2 
the last period. Also, s(t+l) s s(t) + 1 if this citizen encount­
ered a corrupt bureaucrat in the last period. Since 1 > u, the pre­
ceding two ezpressions yield: 1(t+l) >(al+ a2 + t + l)u - a1. 
From (2) and (5a), therefore, this citizen chooses to cheat in the 
current period as well. 
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12. Let the parameters~ and~ denote the 
eaucrats represented by j = 1, 2. Now 
tially corrupt and bureaucrat 2 is not. 
t = S(t) = 0 into (8) and (lla) yields: 
L_[ CA} + A½> U -- A}l. Adding tJIU to all 
initial beliefs of two bur­
suppose bureaucrat 1 is ini-. 
Then substitution of 
[(.\i + ~)U - Ai] > 0 
terms in the preceding 
expression and using (lla) and (llb) one obtains the result: 
R(t, U, M, At, Aj) l R(t, U, M, A}, A½>. An analogous result holds 
concerning the effects of initial beliefs of different citizens on 
their reservat"ion scores. 
13. Such a steady-state is a stylized depiction of the economy and, as 
will become evident, the main value of this depiction is that it 
helps us study the properties of the econOIIIY. In reality, an ecoir 
omy need not arrive at such a steady-state, specially if the dynamic 
path of the economy is subject to perturbations by random influ­
ences. See Samuelson (1979, Ch. XI) for an extensive discussion of 
these issues. 
14. The function B(r, t, C), which is used extensively below, is assumed 
to possess the following conventional properties. If l > C > O, 
then: (i) Bis given by the right hand aide of (16) if t l r > 0, 
(ii) B = 1 if r i 0, and (iii) B = 0 if r > t. If C = 0, then: 
B = 1 if r i 0, and B = 0 if r > O. If C • 1, then: B = 1 if 
r it, and B = 0 if r > t. The above properties a11ume that t > O. 
If t = 0, then: B = 1 if r i 0, and B = 0 if r > O. Using the la1t 
set of properties and the expre11ion1 (1) and (4), it can be veri­
fied that (15) is a special case of (17), to be derived below, when 
t = o. 
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15. As we had indicated earlier, this paper abstracts from normative or 
welfare analysis. It might be useful to note, however, that differ­
ent steady-states are in general not comparable on the Pareto basis. 
Moreover, even if a stronger criterion (such as a social welfare 
function) for comparison across steady-states were to be employed, 
the present aodel does not support any reason to believe that the 
economy would arrive at the 'optimal' 1teady-1tate. The last con­
clusion is analogous to that of Field (1981) and Basu et al. (1987) 
in the context of social customs. 
16. To establish part (a), note from (22) and from the properties of the 
function B described in footnote 14 that: if cl= O then C = O only 
if R(t, U, M, Ai, A2 ) > tM for all t > O. From (lla) and (llb), 
this can happen only if i(t) = (A1 + "2 + tM)U - > tM for allA1 
t > O. But since i(t) - tM is linearly decreasing int, the preced­
ing condition can not be satisfied if tis sufficiently large. The 
proofs of other parts of Proposition 3 are similar. 
17. To establish the si1n of dC/d0 in (25), it is also required that 
fc > O. But the latter condition is automatically satisfied from 
the definition off in (18). Similarly, the si1n of dc/dO in (26) 
requires that Fe> O, which ia satisfied by the definition of Fin 
(22). It ia a1111aed throu1hout that the values of c and Care in 
the interior; that ia, they are lar1er than zero but aaller than 
one. 
18. A chan1e in the extent and the nature of 1ovenment intervention may 
also alter the patterns of interactions between citizens and bureau­
crats. The effects of such changes are analyzed below. 
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19. For a derivation of expression (27), and of expression (28) below, 
see Appendix 2. 
20. To obtain (29), denote the function Fin (22) as F(c, T). Expres­
sion (26) then indicates that an increase in T, from T to T + 1, in­
creases c as well as C if F(c, T + 1) - F(c, T) is positive. The 
result (29} then follows by recalling from (22) that 
T-1 
F(c, T) = r::ct+l/T. The result (30) is obtained similarly from 
t=O 
(18) and (25). 
21. While the present paper is based on a model of Bayesian learning, 
this aspect is not essential. Similar analysis applies with other 
kinds of systematic. learning. For instance, the qualitative fea­
tures of the analysis remain Ullaltered so long as a citizen who has 
encountered a larger number of corrupt bureaucrats in the past be­
lieves that the probability of encountering a corrupt bureaucrat in 
the current period is larger. 
22. Note also that these intertemporal learning externalities are quite 
different (but not mutually exclusive) from some other economic 
forces which have been viewed in the literature as sources of spe­
cific types of societal behavior. Particularly important are the 
analyses in which reputation, sanctions and other strategic aspects 
of an individual'• behavior are central; see Akerlof (1976, 1980). 
23. Such an explicit process should be contrasted with some other con­
texts where multiple equilibria have been eaphaaized but where the 
historical process bringing the economy to one or the other equilib­
rilllll is implicit or unspecified. See Schellin& (1978, Ch. 7) in the 
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context of models of norms, and Diamond (1987) in the context of 
models of credit market. 
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